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I. INTRODUCTION 
Individuals and entities prosecuted for bribing foreign public officials 
certainly are not an appropriate object for sympathy. As the preamble to the 
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions appropriately declares, bribery of this kind 
“raises serious moral and political concerns, undermines good governance and 
economic development, and distorts international competitive conditions.”1 The 
                                                                                                                       
  Michael P. Van Alstine, Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King 
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 1 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions pmbl., 
Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention]. 
1322 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 73:5 
 
legislative history of the implementation of this treaty by the United States 
similarly proclaims that bribery of foreign officials “undermine[s] the goals of 
fostering economic development, trade liberalization, and achieving a level 
playing field throughout the world for businesses.”2 In this light, it is entirely 
correct and just that governments combat international bribery with the most 
aggressive means at their disposal. 
Of its nature, however, the crime of bribery of a “foreign” public official 
affects at least two separate countries (a “home” and a “host”). And for large 
multi-national enterprises a particular offense by a wayward employee may 
implicate the law of numerous sovereign states. In this respect, the worthy goal 
of combating trade-distorting bribery has the potential to collide with 
fundamental notions of fairness, and in particular with the intuition that a person 
should not be subject to successive prosecutions for essentially the same 
criminal act. This protection against “double jeopardy” proceeds from the 
sound, constitutionally grounded3 principle that the State “with all its resources 
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an 
individual for an alleged offense.”4 And it matters not one whit to a defendant 
that the source of the double jeopardy is more than one sovereign state. As 
Justice Black once explained in a convincing dissent, “If double punishment is 
what is feared, it hurts no less for two ‘Sovereigns’ to inflict it than for 
one. . . . In each case, inescapably, a man is forced to face danger twice for the 
same conduct.”5 
The question then, squarely presented, is whether multiple countries may 
prosecute and successively sanction the same person for the same criminal 
offense of “foreign” bribery based on the same act. The answer seems clear, at 
least as a matter of U.S. constitutional law: Under the “dual sovereignty” 
doctrine endorsed by the Supreme Court, the protection against double jeopardy 
simply does not apply.6 A crime, it has reasoned, is an offense against a 
particular sovereign. If a single act of a defendant simultaneously violates the 
laws of two sovereigns, therefore, “he has committed two distinct ‘offences.’”7 
If, then, each sovereign prosecutes based on its own laws, such a person is not 
put in double jeopardy for the same offense. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 2 See TOM BLILEY, INTERNATIONAL ANTI-BRIBERY AND FAIR COMPETITION ACT OF 
1998, H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998). 
 3 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 4 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). 
 5 Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 6 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); United States v. Lanza, 260 
U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see also infra Part III.A. 
 7 Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. 
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In the United States, the legal foundation for the prosecution of foreign 
bribery is of course the subject of this symposium, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.8 But this is no prosaic criminal statute. In its present form as 
amended in 1998, the FCPA reflects the implementation of the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, a formal international treaty which the United States also 
ratified at the time.9 This Convention specifically defines, and then obligates its 
member states to criminalize, two specific offenses involving a foreign public 
official—bribery and complicity in bribery.10 Indeed, as I will explain in more 
detail below,11 the creation of just such an obligation founded in international 
law was the culmination of a decades-long effort by the United States that 
began even before the first passage of the FCPA in 1977. 
My goal here is to explore the effect, if any, of the OECD Convention on 
the long-standing “dual sovereignty” exception to the prohibition against double 
jeopardy. The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded in the notion that the 
establishment of a particular crime arises out of the independent authority of 
each sovereign—that is, from the bottom up and within the silo of domestic law. 
At a minimum, this rationale becomes distorted when countries establish a 
specifically described crime pursuant to an obligation that emanates 
“downward” from international law, and in specific from a formal international 
treaty. 
Part II below sets the background for an exploration of this issue. It first 
describes the key elements of the OECD Convention and the U.S. 
implementation of the treaty through important amendments to the FCPA in 
1998. It then highlights the growing significance of multiple and successive 
prosecutions of the same essential criminal offenses defined by the OECD 
Convention. The increasingly expansive U.S. interpretations of the FCPA as 
enhanced by the Convention—to the point of criminally sanctioning a foreign 
national for actions only tangentially related to the United States—amply 
illustrate the point. 
Part III then provides a review of the dual sovereignty doctrine under U.S. 
constitutional law, including with reference to “international double jeopardy.” 
Because the contours of this doctrine are not complex, a brief summary will 
suffice here. Nonetheless, a basic understanding of the foundations for, and 
implied limitations on, the doctrine is essential for the analysis to follow. Of 
particular significance will be early Supreme Court declarations that the dual 
sovereignty doctrine may not apply where the source of criminal liability is a 
“universal jurisdiction” offense derived from international law.12 
                                                                                                                       
 8 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 9 Ratification Status as of April 2012, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2012). 
 10 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, paras. 1–2 (both providing 
that the member states “shall” establish the defined offenses). 
 11 See infra Part II.A. 
 12 See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text. 
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Part IV explores the validity of the dual sovereignty doctrine in the context 
of an international treaty, and in specific the offenses defined in the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention. It begins with an examination of the proposition that, 
in our constitutional system, a treaty may provide the foundation for double 
jeopardy protection.13 It then reviews the basic principles of treaty law and 
interpretation under the U.S. Constitution.14 Part IV next applies these 
principles to the specific crimes defined by the OECD Convention. 
To be sure, the dual sovereignty doctrine is deeply entrenched in our legal 
system, and courts likely will be skeptical—perhaps strongly so—of a claim 
that a specific treaty displaces it. But I conclude that a compelling argument 
exists in favor of such a conclusion for the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
The treaty creates, and obligates its member states to criminalize, two 
specifically defined crimes. Viewed as a matter of legal obligation, in other 
words, the legal source for the crimes established by the treaty’s member states 
is international law. Consistent with the early Supreme Court observations that 
international law crimes reflect an exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine, 
therefore, I conclude that the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention may well 
preclude successive prosecutions of the same Convention-based offenses. 
In addition to, but conceptually distinct from, this general claim founded on 
basic theory, the Convention’s specific jurisdictional provisions may support 
the same result. I examine this point in the final sections of the Article.15 Where 
two or more member states have jurisdiction over a particular offense, the 
Convention obligates them, upon the request of one, to consult in order to 
“determin[e] the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”16 Without such 
a request, the Convention-based double jeopardy argument almost certainly is 
not viable. But I conclude that a stronger argument exists where one member 
state has specifically invoked the Convention’s obligation of consultation to 
identify the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution. 
International bribery, and in particular of foreign public officials, is indeed 
a curse, one which deserves aggressive prosecution by criminal authorities 
around the world. My purpose here is not to suggest otherwise. Rather, it is 
simply to explore whether the basic principle that a person should not “twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb”17 should extend as well to successive 
prosecutions of a single criminal offense that exists because of, and is 
specifically defined by, an international treaty. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 13 See infra Part IV.A. 
 14 See infra Part IV.B.1. 
 15 See infra Part IV.B.2–B.3. 
 16 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 3. 
 17 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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II. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE CRIME OF BRIBERY 
The basic framework of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is reasonably 
well known, especially to the participants of this symposium. The more specific 
purpose of this Part, therefore, is to situate the FCPA in its international law 
context. Indeed, the most important provisions of the FCPA for purposes of 
extraterritorial enforcement resulted from a decades-long effort by the United 
States to internationalize the crime of bribery through binding treaty 
commitments. The ultimate success of that effort was the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. 
A. The Background and Substance of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention 
Efforts by the United States to establish an international regime for the 
criminalization of bribery date from even before the adoption of the FCPA in 
1977. The so-called Richardson Task Force (for Secretary of State Elliot 
Richardson) reported to Congress in 1976 “that the ultimate legal basis for 
adequately addressing the questionable payments problem must be an 
international treaty.”18 Such a treaty, the Task Force reasoned, “is required to 
assure that all nations, and the competing firms of differing nations, are treated 
on the same basis.”19 When early efforts in this direction brought little progress, 
Congress expressly declared in 1988 (in the process of amending the FCPA) 
“that the President should pursue the negotiation of an international agreement, 
among the members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development” to create a level playing field for U.S. firms in international 
business transactions.20 Indeed, throughout the latter half of the 20th century 
many of our significant trading partners—principal among them Germany and 
France—even permitted their exporters to take a formal tax deduction for bribes 
paid to foreign public officials.21 
The decision to pursue a treaty under the auspices of the OECD was a 
deliberate one. The OECD membership includes most of the economically 
advanced countries in the world.22 The Organization’s thirty-four member 
                                                                                                                       
 18 Foreign Payments Disclosure: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Prot. & 
Fin. of the Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 45 (1976). 
 19 Id. at 46. 
 20 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 § 5003(d)(1), Pub. L. No. 
100-418, 102 Stat. 1415. 
 21 See COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
105-19, at 12 (1998). 
 22 The OECD thus notes that its membership “include[s] many of the world’s most 
advanced countries” (as well as some emerging countries such as Mexico, Chile and 
Turkey). Members and Partners, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, 
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states, therefore, have jurisdiction over the large multi-national enterprises that 
are the most likely sources for “outbound” bribery of foreign public officials. 
Steady diplomacy by the United States within this organization ultimately bore 
fruit in 1998 in the form of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. 
The treaty is surprisingly concise, with only twelve substantive provisions. 
It accomplishes its essential purpose in Article 1 with a specific definition of 
“the offence”—in two cognate forms23—of “bribery of a foreign public 
official.”24 The same provision establishes an obligation of each ratifying state 
to criminalize the two specifically defined offenses through domestic 
implementation of the treaty.25 Article 3 then declares that such offenses “shall 
be punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties.”26 
Other noteworthy provisions address money laundering,27 accounting,28 and 
required international cooperation through mutual legal assistance and 
extradition.29 
Beyond the definition of a specific criminal offense, the most important 
rules of the Convention for present purposes are found in Article 4 on 
“Jurisdiction.” Three aspects are worthy of emphasis. First, Article 4, paragraph 
1 endorses a quite broad conception of territorial jurisdiction by requiring 
member states to establish the legal grounds for prosecution if an offense “is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory.”30 Second, Article 4, paragraph 2 
requires that the member states, consistent with their own laws, establish the 
legal grounds for prosecuting their own nationals “for offences committed 
abroad.”31 With these expansive notions, the field for overlapping exercises of 
jurisdiction is substantial. Finally, to address the likely conflicts when more 
than one member state has jurisdiction over the same offense, Article 4, 
paragraph 3 declares that the involved states “shall, at the request of one of 
them, consult with a view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2012). 
 23 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 1 (defining the 
crime of directly bribing a foreign public official “in order to obtain or retain business or 
other improper advantage in the conduct of international business”); id. at art. 1, para. 2 
(defining the crime of “complicity in . . . or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign 
public official”). 
 24 See id. at art. 1, para. 3 (stating that the two offenses are collectively referred to as 
“bribery of a foreign public official”).  
 25 See id. at art. 1, para. 1 (declaring that “[e]ach Party shall take such measures as may 
be necessary to establish” the defined offense of bribery “under its law”); id. at art. 1, para. 2 
(creating the same obligation of the offense of complicity in bribery). 
 26 Id. at art. 3, para. 1. 
 27 See id. at art. 7. 
 28 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 8. 
 29 See id. at arts. 9 and 10. 
 30 See id. at art. 4, para. 1. 
 31 See id. at art. 4, para. 2. 
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prosecution.”32 For obvious reasons, this final provision will play a significant 
role in the analysis of double jeopardy below.33 
The key message at this point is that, through the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, the United States achieved its decades-long goal of transforming 
diplomatic persuasion into a formal obligation under international law. The 
records of the United States’ own acceptance of the treaty thus are almost 
triumphant in highlighting that the Convention obligates member states to 
criminalize the specifically defined offenses. The Senate’s Executive 
Committee Report consenting to ratification of the treaty in 1998 thus declared 
that “[t]he primary purpose of the Convention . . . is to require Parties to the 
Convention to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials.”34 President 
Clinton’s letter transmitting the treaty to the Senate emphasized the same 
point.35 Indeed, the Senate’s Executive Committee report underscored that “[o]f 
primary import” for the success of the Convention “will be the commitment of 
Parties to implement and enforce fully their obligations under the 
Convention.”36 
B. Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
The United States also was successful in securing broad acceptance of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention with the organization’s member states. In short 
order, all thirty-four OECD member states ratified the Convention,37 and it 
formally entered into force on February 15, 1999.38 The next step, actual 
implementation of the defined treaty obligations, promptly followed. Between 
1999 and early 2004, all OECD member states criminalized in their domestic 
law the specific crimes of “bribery of a foreign public official” defined in 
Article 1 of the Convention.39 
                                                                                                                       
 32 See id. at art. 4, para. 3. 
 33 See infra Part IV.B. 
 34 COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-19, 
at 1 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2 (declaring that “[t]he Convention obligates the 
Parties to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials”). 
 35 See Letter of Transmittal from President William J. Clinton to the Senate of the 
United States, May 4, 1998, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 [hereinafter President’s Letter of 
Transmittal] (declaring the long efforts “to persuade other countries to adopt similar 
legislation [to the FCPA] . . . have resulted in this Convention that once in force, will require 
that the Parties enact laws to criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials”). 
 36 COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-19, 
at 8 (1998).  
 37 See Ratification Status as of April 2012, supra note 9. Subsequently, five non-
member states of the OECD acceded to the Convention as well. See id. 
 38 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Entry into Force of the Convention, ORG. FOR 
ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,3746,en_2649_34859_ 
2057484_1_1_1_1,00.html. 
 39 See Ratification Status as of April 2012, supra note 9. 
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For its part, the Senate of the United States in 1998 promptly gave its 
advice and consent to ratification.40 At the same time, Congress began steps to 
amend the FCPA to conform to the obligations set forth in the Convention. And 
with remarkably little controversy, the result was the International Anti-Bribery 
and Fair Competition Act of 1998.41 Thereafter, President Clinton deposited the 
U.S.’s instrument of ratification of the Convention with the OECD on 
December 8, 1998.42 
For present purposes, the most significant aspect of the amendments of the 
FCPA to implement the OECD Convention was a substantial expansion of the 
power of U.S. prosecutors to pursue alleged acts of bribery with only limited 
connections to the United States. The amendments accomplished this on the 
express foundation of the jurisdictional provisions of the Convention. The first 
significant change addressed the broad territorial reach of Article 4, paragraph 1 
of the Convention.43 The official OECD Commentaries to the Convention 
explain that the territorial nexus requirement under this provision “should be 
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is 
not required.”44 Fully in this spirit, the 1998 amendments added a new provision 
to the FCPA that extends U.S. jurisdiction to “any . . . act in furtherance of” 
bribery by “any person” committed in the territory of the United States.45 The 
required territorial nexus here is thin indeed. In its first submission to the OECD 
on implementation of the Convention, the United States in fact declared that this 
new jurisdictional basis extends to any act beyond “merely conceiv[ing] the 
idea of paying a bribe without undertaking to do so.”46 
  
                                                                                                                       
 40 See S. Exec. Session, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials 
in International Business Transactions, 144 CONG. REC. S9668-01 (daily ed. July 31, 1998). 
 41 Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 
78ff). 
 42 See United States-OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44583078_1_1_1_1,00 
.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2012).  
 43 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 1 (requiring the 
recognition of grounds for jurisdiction whenever a culpable act occurs “in whole or in part” 
in the territory of a member state). 
 44 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COMMENTARIES ON THE CONVENTION 
ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS ADOPTED BY THE NEGOTIATING CONFERENCE para. 25 (1997), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/18/38028044.pdf. 
 45 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006). 
 46 See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., UNITED STATES: REVIEW OF THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION AND 1997 RECOMMENDATION at 1.1.3 (1999), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/16/50/2390377.pdf. Prosecutors in fact have 
adopted such a broad interpretation of this jurisdictional provision. See, e.g., Information at 
19, United States v. Willbros Grp., No. 4:08-CR-00287 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (asserting grounds 
for jurisdiction based solely on a bank transfer and an email from the United States). 
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The second significant expansion of the FCPA on the foundation of the 
OECD Convention addressed “nationality” jurisdiction as provided in Article 4, 
paragraph 2. The implementing amendments to the FCPA expanded the Act’s 
scope beyond those for “issuers” and “domestic concerns” to any “United States 
persons.” The latter concept now broadly includes “a national of the United 
States . . . or any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company, 
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship” that is 
“organized under the laws of the United States or any State.”47 Such persons are 
subject to potential criminal liability under the FCPA for an act committed 
anywhere in the world, including one without any U.S. territorial nexus, and 
even if the act occurs entirely within a foreign country.48 As the Senate Report 
on the FCPA amendments thus emphasized at the time, this ground for 
jurisdiction exists even for an act “that take[s] place wholly outside the United 
States.”49 
With these expansive jurisdictional notions endorsed—indeed required50—
by the OECD Convention, multiple and successive prosecutions of the same 
essential offense are not only possible, but inevitable. As the next section will 
describe, that in fact is what is occurring in modern prosecutions of “bribery of 
a foreign public official” derived from the international law obligations in the 
OECD Convention. 
C. The Growth of Multiple and Successive Prosecutions in the Wake of 
the OECD Convention 
One need not be particularly inventive to create a scenario involving 
multiple prosecutions of a single act of bribery on the foundation of the OECD 
Convention. Imagine a single alleged improper payment to a Nigerian oil 
minister by a sales manager of a Swiss subsidiary of a French company. 
Assume also that the manager is a German national and that she sent an email to 
the oil minister from her mobile phone while vacationing in the United States. 
In addition to possible action in Nigeria (which is not an OECD member), our 
unsuspecting sales manager may be subject to prosecution, and successive 
criminal penalties, for the same alleged offense in France, Switzerland, 
Germany, and the United States (and any other OECD member state in which 
she happened to find herself while communicating with the oil minister). 
  
                                                                                                                       
 47 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i)(2) (2006). 
 48 See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i)(1) (2006). 
 49 COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN 
PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-19, 
at 7 (1998). 
 50 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 1 (stating that 
member states “shall” take measures to establish the defined territorial jurisdiction); id. at 
art. 4, para. 2 (stating the same for the defined nationality jurisdiction). 
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Surprisingly, this hypothetical does not stray too widely from actual 
prosecutions in modern interpretations of the OECD Convention. Indeed, the 
treaty has been the catalyst for a substantial increase in national prosecutions in 
recent years. The most recent enforcement data from the organization’s 
Working Group on Bribery reveal that in the first decade of the Convention 
thirteen member states have imposed criminal sanctions on nearly 200 
individuals and ninety-one entities.51 At least fifty-four of the sanctioned 
individuals were sentenced to prison for foreign bribery.52 At the present time, 
fifteen member states are pursuing approximately 260 similar investigations.53 
Five states report pending criminal charges against over 120 individuals and 
twenty entities.54 
Of this group, the United States certainly has been the most aggressive 
prosecutor and has employed the most expansive interpretation of its own 
jurisdictional authority. Between January 1998 and February 2012, the United 
States initiated over 100 FCPA prosecutions.55 A mere sampling of these 
aggressive actions reveals the breadth of prosecutions with limited connections 
to the United States. Thus, for example, the Department of Justice has pursued 
or is pursuing prosecutions against a German Company and its Hungarian 
subsidiary for bribery of public officials in Macedonia;56 against a French 
company for alleged bribery by three foreign subsidiaries of third-country 
officials;57 a Swiss oil services company and its U.S.-based subsidiary for an 
alleged bribery scheme involving officials in numerous foreign countries;58 a 
Nigerian subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell Plc (a joint British-Dutch company) 
for bribery of Nigerian customs officials;59 a Cayman Islands subsidiary of a 
                                                                                                                       
 51 See Working Group on Bribery: 2010 Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Apr. 2011), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/47/39/47637707.pdf. 
 52 See id. 
 53 See id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STEPS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES TO 
IMPLEMENT AND ENFORCE THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION (2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/2012-02-29-steps-taken-oecd-anti-bribery-
convention.pdf. 
 56 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom 
Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agree to Pay Nearly $64 Million in 
Combined Criminal Penalties (Dec. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1714.html. 
 57 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Alcatel-Lucent S.A. and Three Subsidiaries 
Agree to Pay $92 Million to Resolve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation (Dec. 27, 
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/December/10-crm-1481.html. 
 58 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Oil Services Companies and a Freight 
Forwarding Company Agree to Resolve Foreign Bribery Investigations and to Pay More 
than $156 Million in Criminal Penalties (Nov. 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/2010/November/10-crm-1251.html. 
 59 See id. 
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Swiss company for bribery by agents in Nigeria of Nigerian customs officials;60 
and another Cayman Islands subsidiary of a company headquartered in the 
United States for bribes paid to tax inspectors in Azerbaijan.61 In the same vein, 
the United States sentenced to prison a non-U.S. citizen working for a non-U.S. 
company for bribery that occurred in Costa Rica.62 The only connection to the 
United States was that the foreign employer had issued American Depositary 
Receipts (ADRs) in this country and some payments came from a U.S. bank 
account.63 
Many of the criminal sanctions imposed by the United States (most often 
through settlements with the corporate entities) cover actions that other member 
states to the OECD Convention were prosecuting or had already punished. To 
pick just a few further examples, Aon Corporation, a U.K. company, accepted 
criminal sanctions by the United States in 2011 even though the United 
Kingdom had already punished the same acts of alleged bribery by its 
subsidiaries in 2009;64 the Norwegian state oil company, Statoil, accepted 
criminal penalties by the United States in 2006 for bribery of Iranian officials 
even though Norway had already sanctioned the company for the same acts in 
2004;65 and the United States imposed a prison sentence on a South Korean 
national for bribery after South Korea had already imposed its own sanctions, 
and even though the United States had first expressly deferred to the 
proceedings in South Korea.66 At the present time, Hewlett-Packard is subject to 
parallel investigations and potential successive penalties in Germany and the 
United States for alleged bribery by one of its German subsidiaries of Russian 
public officials.67 
The message here is not that the companies involved were necessarily 
innocent of the alleged acts of bribery or that their employees and agents were 
angels. Rather, this brief sampling of past and present prosecutions is designed 
to illustrate the practical effects of the extremely broad jurisdictional provisions 
of the OECD Convention. In our modern, deeply interconnected world 
                                                                                                                       
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Former Alcatel CIT Executive Sentenced 
for Paying $2.5 Million in Bribes to Senior Costa Rican Officials (Sept. 23, 2008), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-crm-848.html. 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Aon Corporation Agrees to Pay a $1.76 
Million Criminal Penalty in Bribes to Senior Costa Rican Officials (Dec. 20, 2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-crm-1678.html. 
 65 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil Company 
that Bribed Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/2006/October/06_crm_700.html. 
 66 See United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 707–08 (5th Cir. 2010). For more on this 
case, see infra notes 146–52 and accompanying text. 
 67 See Hewlett-Packard, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (July 31, 2010), available at 
http://yahoo.brand.edgar-online.com/displayfilinginfo.aspx?FilingID=7453719-839-
442842&type=sect&dcn=0001047469-10-007964>. 
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economy, the result in practical terms is that numerous countries may subject a 
person to successive criminal sanctions for the same criminal offense, although 
in each case the ultimate source of law is the Convention itself. Again, those 
that commit acts of foreign bribery are by no means deserving of sympathy. But 
as the next section will explore in more detail, the kind of multiple and 
successive prosecutions that the OECD Convention enables may collide directly 
with fundamental protections against “double jeopardy.” 
III. DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE “DUAL SOVEREIGNTY” DOCTRINE 
A. The Foundations of the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine 
The notion that an individual should not be prosecuted twice for the same 
crime goes back to ancient times.68 For readers of this paper, the most famous 
modern declaration of this fundamental principle of justice (and the source of 
the term “double jeopardy”) is certainly the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.69 But not surprisingly, similar notions exist in other countries, 
most commonly under the Latin term non bis in idem (“not twice for the same 
thing”). 
What might surprise is the U.S. Supreme Court’s spin on the phrase “same 
offense” in the Fifth Amendment. Under the so-called “dual sovereignty” 
doctrine endorsed by the Court, the protection against being “twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb” does not extend to successive prosecutions by different 
sovereigns.70 As Anthony Colangelo has chronicled, the Supreme Court laid the 
groundwork for this doctrine in a variety of cases from the 19th century.71 The 
first definitive statement of the proposition came in a true case of multiple 
prosecutions for the same essential offense in United States v. Lanza in 1922.72 
There, the court upheld successive prosecutions by state and federal 
governments for violation of prohibition laws: 
 We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources, 
capable of dealing with the same subject matter within the same 
                                                                                                                       
 68 See Anthony J. Colangelo, Double Jeopardy and Multiple Sovereigns: A 
Jurisdictional Theory, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 769, 778–79 (2009). 
 69 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person “shall . . . be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”). 
 70 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 
382 (1922). For more thorough examinations of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see Akhil 
Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 4–27 (1995); Colangelo, supra note 68, at 778–90; Kenneth M. Murchison, The 
Dual Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 383 
(1986); George C. Thomas III, Islands in the Stream of History: An Institutional Archeology 
of Dual Sovereignty, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 345 (2003). 
 71 See Colangelo, supra note 68, at 783–87. 
 72 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). 
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territory. . . . Each government in determining what shall be an offense against 
its peace and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other. 
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state 
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be 
punished by each.73 
Since then the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the dual sovereignty doctrine 
in a variety of possible federal–state and state–state pairings74 (and even 
pairings involving Native American Tribes),75 provided always that the 
successive prosecution was not by the same sovereign. 
Distilled to its essence, the dual sovereignty doctrine proceeds from “the 
common-law conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the 
government.”76 As a result, an act defined as criminal by both national and state 
sovereignties may be punished by both without violating the protection against 
double jeopardy.77 In the reasoning of the dual sovereignty doctrine, when a 
person contravenes the laws of two distinct sovereigns, “he has committed two 
distinct ‘offences.’”78 Indeed, Justice Holmes once observed that the proposition 
that the state and federal governments may twice punish the same act “is too 
plain to need more than statement.”79 
As this brief review indicates, the dual sovereignty doctrine arose 
principally within the historical context of our federal system of concurrent state 
and federal jurisdiction. In modern times of course, the possibility of 
prosecution by multiple sovereigns has assumed international dimensions. The 
Supreme Court has not yet formally addressed whether the dual sovereignty 
doctrine applies to sequential foreign and domestic prosecutions.80 Nonetheless, 
                                                                                                                       
 73 Id. 
 74 See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 
187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 
 75 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199–210 (2004); United States v. Wheeler, 
435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
 76 Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. 
 77 See id. at 89 (reaffirming the observation in Lanza, 260 U.S. at 382, that an act 
contrary to the criminal laws of both state and federal governments “is an offense against the 
peace and dignity of both and may be punished by each”). 
 78 Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. The one potential caveat to the doctrine is the so-called “sham 
prosecution” exception. In Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 123–24 (1959), the Supreme 
Court impliedly recognized such an exception when it took seriously a defendant’s claim 
that a state had acted “merely [as] a tool of the federal authorities” and that the state 
prosecution was “a sham and a cover for a federal prosecution.” Federal courts have since 
been quite skeptical of the exception, however, and none has accepted it in an actual case. 
See, e.g., United States v. Mardis, 600 F.3d 693, 696–99 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1119 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 
1282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 79 Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256, 258 (1927). 
 80 The Court obliquely addressed the subject in United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666 
(1998). There, the Court held that a fear of prosecution in a foreign country generally would 
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the courts of appeals have uniformly found that the doctrine applies with equal 
vigor in the international context.81  
Without more, therefore, the dual sovereignty doctrine would seem to 
preclude any viable claim that the double jeopardy principle is relevant to 
prosecutions of foreign bribery by different countries. Because each state 
exercises its own sovereign powers, the reasoning would run, a single act could 
represent a crime against each, even if the involved states define the offense 
with the same factual and legal elements. As the next section will explore, 
however, the premise of the dual sovereignty doctrine becomes unstable for the 
prosecution of crimes derived from international law. And, like the obligation to 
criminalize “bribery of a foreign public official” set forth in the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, no form of international law is more specific and 
substantial than a formal treaty between sovereign states. 
B. Examining the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine for Crimes Under 
International Law  
As the name implies, the justification for the dual sovereignty doctrine lies 
in the exercise of independent authority by independent sovereigns. Successive 
prosecutions of the same person for what would seem to be the same act thus do 
not represent “double” jeopardy where the prosecutors “draw their authority to 
punish the offender from distinct sources of power.”82 A criminal act exists in 
reference to a particular sovereign state. Each state, in turn, “has the power, 
inherent in any sovereign, independently to determine what shall be an offense 
against its authority and to punish such offenses.”83 And “[f]oremost among the 
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal 
code.”84 In short, where two or more sovereigns criminalize a particular act in 
exercise of their independent lawmaking prerogatives, each may prosecute 
without violating the prohibition on double jeopardy. 
If one accepts the premise, the logic holds within our unique federal system. 
The states each have a sovereign power to create their own criminal codes. The 
same is true of the federal government. And although the Constitution makes 
federal law supreme over state law,85 the states are under no obligation to 
criminalize any particular conduct simply because the federal government has 
                                                                                                                       
not provide a basis for asserting the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in a 
judicial proceeding in the United States. See id. at 698–99. 
 81 See, e.g., United States v. Studabaker, 578 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Rashed, 234 F.3d 1280, 1281–82 (D.C. Cir. 2000); United States v. Guzman, 85 
F.3d 823, 826 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d 1354, 1362 (11th 
Cir. 1994); Chua Han Mow v. United States, 730 F.2d 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 82 Heath, 474 U.S. at 88. 
 83 Id. at 89–90 (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320 (1978)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 84 Id. at 93. 
 85 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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done so. To state the point more directly, the federal government may no more 
obligate the states to establish a particular crime than the states could do the 
same in reverse. 
The matter becomes murkier, however, when one considers the force and 
effect of international law. The Constitution makes international treaties the 
“supreme Law of the Land.”86 Separately, it expressly empowers the Congress 
to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”87 As a more 
general (and also more controversial) point, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that international law forms a direct part of our domestic law.88 In 
appropriate cases, therefore, international law “must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction.”89 
The “dual” aspect of the dual sovereignty doctrine thus becomes less clear 
where domestic courts directly apply international law—that is, law not solely 
derived from the “independent” prerogatives of a particular sovereign. The 
Supreme Court itself planted the seeds of thought in this direction in the 1820 
case of United States v. Furlong.90 There, the Court addressed the distinction 
between the separate crimes of piracy and murder. Under the prevailing view of 
the times, piracy was not “committed against the particular sovereignty of a 
foreign power[,] but . . . against all nations, including the United States.”91 The 
Court in Furlong thus observed that all countries could exercise jurisdiction 
over piracy, whatever the state of their national criminal law, as a result of 
“universal jurisdiction.”92 This jurisdiction, the Court reasoned, resulted from 
the fact that piracy, in contrast to murder, was a crime that derives directly from 
the “law of nations” (the terminological predecessor of international law).93  
In the Court’s view, this distinction had direct implications for the doctrine 
of double jeopardy. Using the French term for the doctrine (“autre fois 
acquit”—already acquitted), the Court explained that a person should not be 
subject to successive prosecutions in different countries for the crime of 
piracy—“robbery on the seas”—under international law: 
Robbery on the seas is considered as an offence within the criminal jurisdiction 
of all nations. It is against all, and punished by all; and there can be no doubt 
                                                                                                                       
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 88 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730 (2004) (stating that “[i]nternational 
law is part of our law” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 89 Id. (stating that international law “must be ascertained and administered by the courts 
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are 
duly presented for their determination” (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 90 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820). 
 91 United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 152 (1820). 
 92 Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 197. 
 93 See id. 
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that the plea of autre fois acquit would be good in any civilized State, though 
resting on a prosecution instituted in the Courts of any other civilized State.94 
Even before the Supreme Court’s opinion in Furlong, Congress had 
amended the federal piracy statute to provide for an express incorporation of the 
law of nations as the direct source of law.95 In this way, Congress in effect 
opened the door to direct application of international law on the foundation of 
its constitutional power, noted above, to “define and punish . . . offenses against 
the Law of Nations.”96 The Supreme Court then promptly affirmed the power of 
Congress to do so with specific reference to that piracy statute.97 
As a practical matter, piracy nonetheless remained the only form of 
international criminal law of the time. Moreover, the practice rapidly waned in 
significance even in the 19th century.98 As a result, federal courts have not had 
occasion to elaborate on the views expressed in United States v. Furlong. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that the reasoning in Furlong remains viable, as 
the Fifth Circuit acknowledged in the 1978 case of United States v. Martin.99 
That case involved successive prosecutions by the Bahamas and the United 
States for the crime of marijuana possession. The Fifth Circuit asserted there 
that “[t]he Constitution of the United States has not adopted the doctrine of 
international double jeopardy.”100 But in doing so, the court, citing United 
States v. Furlong, emphasized that this was true because the criminal acts at 
issue were not “the subject of universal agreement among nations.”101 
  
                                                                                                                       
 94 Id. 
 95 Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 101, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513–14 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 1651 (2006)) (“That if any person or persons whatsoever, shall, on the high seas, 
commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations, and such offender or offenders, 
shall afterwards be brought into or found in the United States, every such offender or 
offenders shall, upon conviction thereof, before the circuit court of the United States for the 
district into which he or they may be brought, or in which he or they shall be found, be 
punished with death.”). 
 96 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
 97 See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 158 (1820) (upholding a 
conviction under the piracy statute against a claim that Congress could not leave the matter 
to judicial interpretation); see also United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 632 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) (observing with reference to this piracy statute, that “when Congress enacts a 
statute that expressly incorporates customary international law into the domestic law of the 
United States, the federal courts are required, as with any other constitutional congressional 
mandate, to follow the statutory language adopted by Congress and apply customary 
international law”). 
 98 Unfortunately, piracy recently has made a bit of comeback. See Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 
2d at 614 (addressing a prosecution for piracy under the 1819 statute); United States v. Said, 
757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 557 (E.D. Va. 2010) (same). 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 99 574 F.2d 1359, 1360 (5th Cir. 1978). Id. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
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As a more general phenomenon, the recent rise of international criminal law 
also provides an occasion for a reexamination of the Supreme Court’s insights 
in Furlong. As the next Part will explore, these insights may well have 
significant implications for the dual sovereignty doctrine in the context of 
crimes derived from an international treaty. 
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY-BASED PROTECTIONS AGAINST DOUBLE 
JEOPARDY 
At its most elemental, the intuition at the foundation of the double jeopardy 
clause is that the state should not be permitted to apply twice the same criminal 
law to the same individual for the same act. The dual sovereignty doctrine 
cleverly maneuvers around this intuition with the reasoning that each sovereign 
establishes its own law, and thus two prosecuting sovereigns, although they may 
seek to sanction the same act, do not apply the “same” criminal law. 
In this Part, I first examine whether this reasoning holds when the source of 
law is an international treaty. I then explore whether, beyond general principles, 
the specific text of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention confers protection 
against double jeopardy for the offences it defines and requires member states 
to incorporate into domestic law. 
A. Double Jeopardy and Crimes Derived from a Treaty 
It is of course possible that general norms of international law could provide 
protection against “international double jeopardy.” Indeed, Article 14(7) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressly 
provides such a protection where an individual “has already been finally 
convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each 
country.”102 As Anthony Colangelo has convincingly explained, however, even 
if such a norm has attained customary international law status, it would only 
prohibit successive prosecutions by the same state.103 The same is true for the 
other non-conventional source of international legal rules—general principles of 
international law.104 Although broad congruence exists among the domestic 
                                                                                                                       
 102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, para. 7, Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 103 Colangelo, supra note 68, at 805–15; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102(1)(a) (1987) (recognizing customary 
international law as binding). Beyond this, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law asserts only that a state should not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction where this would 
be “unreasonable.” See id. § 403(1) (stating that “a state may not exercise jurisdiction to 
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when 
the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable”). 
 104 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1)(c) (stating that a 
rule of international law may arise “by derivation from general principles common to the 
major legal systems of the world”). 
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laws in the international community, this relates only to successive prosecutions 
by the same specific sovereign authority.105 
Nonetheless, the key insight of United States v. Furlong, properly framed, 
is not founded on notions of human rights recognized by international law. That 
insight is instead directed at the “same offence” rationale of the dual 
sovereignty doctrine as understood and applied by courts of the United States. It 
proceeds from the fact that, in contrast to “dual” domestic criminal codes, 
crimes recognized in international law emanate from a single source of law. 
Where, therefore, international law provides the substantive criminal offense, 
successive prosecutions by two sovereigns in fact may twice put a defendant “in 
jeopardy of life or limb” for “the same offence.”106 
Treaties represent the most concrete and specific form of international law. 
Their very purpose is to create formal, binding legal obligations for ratifying 
states.107 Treaties likewise reflect a single source of law that each member state 
must interpret and apply in good faith.108 As a matter of domestic constitutional 
law, the Supremacy Clause elevates “all Treaties” to the “supreme Law of the 
Land.”109 Treaties, therefore, represent (unless their substance reflects 
otherwise)110 a direct source of domestic law in the United States. The 
constitutional systems of numerous other countries recognize a similar 
principle.111 
  
                                                                                                                       
 105 See Colangelo, supra note 68, at 815–19.  
 106 U.S. CONST. amend. V. For a broader review of this argument, see Colangelo, supra 
note 68, at 799–803. See generally Dax Eric Lopez, Note, Not Twice for the Same: How the 
Dual Sovereignty Doctrine Is Used to Circumvent Non Bis In Idem, 33 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 1263 (2000). 
 107 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, 339 (providing that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 321 (same). 
 108 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 107, at art. 26; see also 
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 103, § 325 
cmt. d (“Treaties that lay down rules to be enforced by the parties through their internal 
courts or administrative agencies should be construed so as to achieve uniformity of result 
despite differences between national legal systems.”). 
 109 See U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
 110 See infra notes 135–42 and accompanying text (examining the self-executing treaty 
doctrine). 
 111 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Role of Domestic Courts in Treaty Enforcement: 
Summary and Conclusions, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY ENFORCEMENT: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY, 555, 555–613 (David Sloss ed., 2009) (summarizing the direct 
enforcement of treaties in, inter alia, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, and South 
Africa). 
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This perspective on the legal status of international treaties may carry 
important implications for our understanding of the force and effect of the 
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.112 As explored above,113 the essential purpose 
of the Convention was to create an international obligation by its member states 
to establish a specifically defined crime. Indeed, the very title of the 
Convention’s first provision uses the definite article “the” when identifying a 
single notion of “offence of bribery of a foreign public official.”114 That first 
provision then expressly defines the elements of the two forms of that specific 
offense.115 It also creates a formal obligation for each member state to 
“establish” this specific offense.116 Moreover, the OECD Commentaries for the 
Convention emphasize that, although the precise terminology of Article 1 is not 
required, the member state may not “require proof of elements beyond those 
which would be required to be proved if the offence were defined as in this 
paragraph.”117 
Finally, the Convention’s preamble emphasizes the need for uniformity in 
the fulfillment of the obligation to criminalize the defined offense. It first states 
that “achieving equivalence among the measures to be taken by the Parties is an 
essential object and purpose of the Convention.”118 To secure this end, the 
preamble declares that each member state must ratify the Convention “without 
derogations affecting this equivalence.”119 Indeed, as described above,120 it was 
the specific goal of the United States’ decades-long effort to create an express, 
formal obligation under international law that our OECD trading partners 
establish the specific offense now defined in the Convention. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 112 Indeed, the most ambitious effort to prosecute international crimes by treaty 
incorporates an express double jeopardy protection. The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court expressly precludes certain forms of successive prosecution—by that court 
or a national court—for crimes defined in that treaty. See Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court art. 20, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (recognizing the “ne bis in idem” 
principle). 
 113 See supra Part II.A–B.  
 114 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 1. 
 115 Id. at art. 1, paras. 1–2. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at para. 3. The Convention leaves more 
discretion to the member states with regard to other issues. See, e.g., OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 3, para. 1 (allowing the member states to determine 
“effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions); id. at art. 5 (providing that investigation 
and prosecution “shall be subject to the applicable rules and principles” of each member 
state); id. at art. 6 (requiring with regard to statute of limitations only that each member state 
allow “an adequate period of time” for investigation). 
 118 See id. at pmbl. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text. 
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For the United States, the present version of the FCPA reflects a direct 
implementation of this international law obligation. Indeed, both the Senate and 
House reports on the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 
1998 expressly state that the purpose of the FCPA amendments was to 
implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.121 The House Report states the 
point directly: “This legislation amends the FCPA to conform it to the 
requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”122 Moreover, this 
legislative history—like its source, the OECD Convention itself—uses the 
definite article “the” to describe the specific offense Congress established in 
U.S. law through the conforming amendment of the FCPA.123 And the greatly 
enhanced potential for successive prosecutions by the United States arises 
precisely because of the greatly expanded jurisdictional notions under the 
Convention. 
Were any doubt to exist on the breadth of implementation, U.S. courts have 
long recognized a strong presumption that Congress intends its statutes to 
conform to international treaty obligations.124 This presumption is particularly 
strong for statutes specifically designed to implement a treaty.125 These more 
specific rules also operate within a general presumption that Congress intends to 
abide by international law.126 
Properly understood, in short, the 1998 FCPA amendments reflected an 
incorporation of “the offense” defined by the OECD Convention. Indeed, the 
legislative history for the 1998 amendments explicitly states as a ground of 
authority the power of Congress to “define and punish . . . [o]ffenses against the 
Law of Nations.”127 The amendments represented the fulfillment of the United 
                                                                                                                       
 121 See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998) (stating the purpose of the Act was “to 
implement the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) 
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions”); H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11 (1998) (“This legislation amends the FCPA to 
conform it to the requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”). 
 122 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11. 
 123 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 5. 
 124 See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) 
(declaring a “firm and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal 
of a treaty in ambiguous congressional action”); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 
(1933) (“A treaty will not be deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute 
unless such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed.”). 
 125 See In re Commissioner’s Subpoenas, 325 F.3d 1287, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that legislation designed to make the enforcement of a treaty more convenient cannot amend 
or abrogate the treaty); cf. Cannon v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 973 F.2d 1190, 1197 (5th Cir. 
1992) (“Procedural legislation which makes operation of a Treaty more convenient cannot 
amend or abrogate a self-executing Treaty.”). 
 126 See F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) 
(declaring the presumption that “Congress ordinarily seeks to follow” “principles of 
customary international law”); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 
118 (1804) (“It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed 
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”). 
 127 See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 10).  
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States’ international obligations under the Convention. To fulfill their respective 
obligations, the other member states did the same thing. And in each case, the 
member states were required to incorporate the Convention’s defined offense 
“without derogations affecting th[e] equivalence” among them.128 
This perspective undermines a principal justification for the “dual 
sovereignty” approach to double jeopardy. The OECD Convention represents 
the ultimate source of law for the specific offense it defines. Each member state 
fulfills its international law obligation under the Convention by incorporating 
that specific offense into its domestic law. And once each member state has 
assumed the international law obligation, it is to that extent—in the words of the 
decisive Supreme Court opinion on the dual sovereignty doctrine—no longer 
“independently . . . determin[ing] what shall be an offense against its 
authority.”129 
In turn, the incorporation by each member state of the specific elements 
defined in the Convention makes clear that successive prosecutions satisfy the 
factual predicates for double jeopardy protection. The Supreme Court’s 
established Blockburger test for double jeopardy focuses on whether two 
criminal statutes involve the “same elements.”130 As the Court explained in 
United States v. Dixon, this “same-elements test . . . inquires whether each 
offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the ‘same 
offence’ and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive 
prosecution.”131 This is certainly the case for criminal offenses under the OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention, which specifically defines the elements of “the 
offense” that all member states must incorporate into their domestic law. 
If two member states prosecute the same person for the same act as defined 
by the Convention, therefore, a compelling argument exists that they are twice 
putting the person in jeopardy for the same offense. As a matter of emphasis, 
this is not merely a case of parallel criminal offenses under domestic law. In the 
spirit of United States v. Furlong, rather, the ultimate, singular source for “the 
offense” is the international law reflected in the Convention. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 128 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at pmbl. 
 129 Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435 
U.S. 313, 320 (1978)). 
 130 See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (citing Blockburger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)).  
 131 Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696; see also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 172–73 (2001) (also 
endorsing this “Blockburger test”); Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 297 (1996) 
(same). 
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To be sure, this argument is not airtight. A skeptic will immediately 
respond, and with some force, that member states retain the formal power—
should they choose to breach their legal obligations—not to implement the 
Convention. Even if international law provides the substantive content of the 
offense, the skeptic will argue, the “ultimate source of power”132 to create the 
crime of bribery of a foreign public official is the legislative authority of each 
state. Dual sovereignty remains. 
The argument of “treaty double jeopardy” nonetheless is worthy of serious 
attention by the defense bar and the courts. The OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention defines a specific offense and simultaneously creates an 
international law obligation to establish that specific offense—without 
derogations—in domestic law. Where the member states fulfill their legal 
obligations by implementing the treaty, therefore, they are incorporating the 
international law reflected in the Convention. Such an act, to return to the 
metaphor suggested in the Introduction, does not reflect the traditional premise 
of a sovereign state independently creating a crime from the bottom up and 
within the silo of domestic law. The proper way to conceive of the act, rather, is 
as an incorporation of single criminal offense that emanates “downward” from 
international law. In such a case, a compelling argument may well exist that two 
OECD member states may not subject one person to prosecution for “the same 
offense” defined therein.133 
B. The Provisions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention as a Separate 
Source of Double Jeopardy Protection 
1. The Principles of Treaty Interpretation 
Part IV.A above examined the general norms that may found a protection 
against double jeopardy for treaty-based offenses. Here, I turn to the specific 
terms of the OECD Convention. The distinction is subtle, but significant. 
Wholly apart from the constitutional principles explored above, a treaty may, by 
its own terms, establish protections against successive prosecution. As the D.C. 
Circuit has correctly observed, “[i]t is certainly possible that a treaty could 
contain a double jeopardy provision more restrictive—that is, barring more 
prosecutions—than the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.”134 
The foundation for such a result lies in the concept of a self-executing 
treaty. Recall that the Supremacy Clause provides that “all Treaties” are 
supreme federal law.135 On this basis, since the very founding of the Republic 
the President has concluded and the Senate has given its consent to treaties that 
create rights or obligations directly enforceable by individuals in domestic 
                                                                                                                       
 132 Heath, 474 U.S. at 90 (quoting Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 320). 
 133 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 134 United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 135 U.S. CONST. art. VI. 
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courts.136 The self-executing treaty doctrine is one of the most animated subjects 
of modern scholarly and judicial debate. But it will suffice at this point to 
observe, as the Supreme Court recently reiterated, that a treaty of this type 
“operates of itself” as domestic law “without the aid of any legislative 
provision.”137 On the other hand, some treaties (“non-self-executing” treaties) 
from text or context may not function as domestic law in this direct way.138 
The difficult distinction between the two types of treaties requires resort to 
the basic principles of treaty interpretation. “The interpretation of a treaty,” the 
Supreme Court recently observed, “begins with its text.”139 But this inquiry also 
unfolds within the important context that a treaty by its nature is “an agreement 
among sovereign powers.”140 From this, the Court has reasoned that the key 
goal of interpretation is “to read the treaty in a manner ‘consistent with the 
shared expectations of the [treaty] parties.’”141 To this end, in interpreting a 
treaty the courts may consider its “negotiation and drafting history” as well as 
“the postratification understanding” of the member states.142 Finally, with 
regard to the specific issue of self-execution, the Supreme Court has focused on 
“whether a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who 
negotiated it and the Senate that confirmed it that the treaty has domestic 
effect.”143 
The text of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in fact provides important 
material for analysis on the possible invocation of double jeopardy protections. 
As I described in Part II.B. above, the United States incorporated, from Article 
4 of the Convention, quite broad notions of territoriality and nationality as 
foundations for an exercise of criminal jurisdiction.144 But in return, Article 4, 
paragraph 3—under the general heading of “Jurisdiction” in Article 4—directly 
                                                                                                                       
 136 For a comprehensive review of the over 500 treaties that function as domestic law in 
this way, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in an Age of Treaties, 89 
CORNELL L. REV. 892, 921–23 (2004). 
 137 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505 (2008) (quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 
Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)); see also id. at 505–06 (observing that self-executing treaty provisions 
have “the force and effect of a legislative enactment” (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190, 194 (1888))); United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801). 
 138 As the Supreme Court observed in Medellín, the point of a non-self-executing treaty 
is that it “addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature 
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court.” 552 U.S. at 516 
(quoting Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)). 
 139 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–07 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 396–97 
(1985)). 
 140 Id. at 507 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)); 
see also Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 
522, 533 (1987). 
 141 Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 
470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)).  
 142 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 507; see also El Al Israel Airlines Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 
167 (1999); Zicherman, 516 U.S. at 226. 
 143 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521. 
 144 See supra notes 43–50 and accompanying text. 
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addresses the very real possibility of jurisdictional competition for prosecution 
of “the offense” defined in the Convention. Because of this, the provision is 
worthy of full quotation here: “When more than one Party has jurisdiction over 
an alleged offence described in this Convention, the Parties involved shall, at 
the request of one of them, consult with a view to determining the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.”145 
The most conspicuous language of this provision is the singular phrase at 
the end, “the most appropriate” jurisdiction for prosecution. This superlative, 
however, is subject to the important predicate of a “request” by an interested 
member state. Different consequences thus may attach depending on the 
existence of such a request. In the sections to follow, therefore, I will analyze in 
turn each of the two alternatives. 
2. Treaty-Based Protection Without a Request for Consultation by 
Another Member State 
We may easily dispense with the possibility that Article 4, paragraph 3 
alone creates a self-executing protection against double jeopardy without a 
corresponding request by at least one member state. To be sure, the provision 
uses the language of obligation (“shall . . . consult”). Nonetheless, the provision 
clearly contemplates a formal request by another interested member state as 
necessary condition. That is, even the obligation to consult is only triggered “at 
the request” of another member state. Even if the provision creates self-
executing private rights, therefore, such a formal request is a predicate to any 
possible identification of “the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.” 
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Jeong recently addressed this very 
issue and reached the same conclusion.146 At issue there was a South Korean 
national who was first convicted and sentenced in South Korea for bribing 
American public officials to secure a telecommunications contract.147 
Thereafter, U.S. officials induced Jeong to travel to this country and then 
promptly indicted him for the same bribery scheme.148 Because South Korea is 
also member state to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, Jeong raised Article 
4, paragraph 3 as a bar against successive prosecution by the United States.149 
  
                                                                                                                       
 145 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 3. 
 146 See United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 147 Jeong, 624 F.3d at 707. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 710–11. 
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The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument based on “the plain language of 
Article 4.3.”150 “The phrase ‘at the request of one of them,’” the court reasoned, 
“is a dependent clause that conditions the consultation requirement on the 
existence of a request.”151 Because neither the United States nor South Korea 
had made such a formal request before prosecution by either, the court 
concluded that Article 4, paragraph 3 simply did not apply.152 
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in Jeong is eminently convincing. Basic 
principles of treaty interpretation require primary resort to a treaty’s text, and 
that text seems clear. But even reference to extrinsic sources such as drafting 
history does not undermine this conclusion. No formal travaux préparatoires 
exists for the Convention.153 And although the OECD produced official 
“Commentaries,” these contain no explanatory material on Article 4, paragraph 
3.154 Likewise, neither the analysis prepared by the U.S. State Department155 nor 
the Senate Executive Report on the treaty addresses the issue.156 We are left, 
then, with the text. That text leaves little room for an argument of treaty-based 
double jeopardy protection in absence of a formal “request” for consultation by 
a competing member state. 
3. Treaty-Based Protection with a Request for Consultation by Another 
Member State 
The provisions of the OECD Convention nonetheless may support a strong 
double jeopardy argument where another state with jurisdiction formally 
requests consultation to determine “the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.”157 Before turning to the specifics of this argument, however, our 
analysis may benefit from a reminder that this issue is independent of the 
constitutional argument outlined in Part III.A above. That Part examined 
whether basic constitutional principles create double jeopardy protections when 
an international treaty is the source of law for a specifically defined criminal 
offense. Although this examination provides a valuable context, an argument 
founded on the specific language of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is 
distinct from, and in addition to, the general constitutional principles that 
address the relationship between international law and our domestic legal 
                                                                                                                       
 150 Id. at 711. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: 
Frequently Asked Questions for 2011 Jessup Competitors, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION 
& DEV., http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/1/46510795.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2012). 
 154 See COMMENTARIES, supra note 44, at paras. 25–26. 
 155 See President’s Letter of Transmittal, supra note 35, at VII. 
 156 See COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
105-19, at 4 (1998). 
 157 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 3. 
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system. This is the message of the D.C. Circuit’s insight, noted above, that a 
treaty itself may contain a double jeopardy “provision” that is “more 
restrictive . . . than the Constitution’s Double Jeopardy Clause.”158 
Here as well, we of course begin with the text. Recall first that Article 4, 
paragraph 3 functions within the general subject of “Jurisdiction” covered by 
Article 4 as a whole. And, significantly, both article 4, paragraph 1 (on 
territorial jurisdiction) and Article 4, paragraph 2 (on nationality jurisdiction) 
focus on “the” specific offense of “bribery of a foreign public official” as 
defined in the Convention. Thus, Article 4, paragraph 1 extends jurisdiction 
based on territory only when “the offence” is committed in whole or in part in a 
member state. Article 4, paragraph 2 does the same with respect to nationality 
jurisdiction. With this background, Article 4, paragraph 3 prescribes a rule to 
address “[w]hen more than one Party has jurisdiction” over this specific offence 
“described in this Convention.” 
Where one such member state makes a corresponding request, the provision 
states an obligation: The competing states “shall . . . consult.” It also identifies 
the purpose of the obligation: “with a view to determining the most appropriate 
jurisdiction for prosecution.”159 The Fifth Circuit in Jeong, in dicta, also 
addressed whether such a request would have altered its analysis. In doing so, 
however, the court focused exclusively on words “with a view.”160 Seeing this 
language as aspirational only, the court concluded that, even if a member state 
makes a formal request for consultation, Article 4, paragraph 3 ultimately 
reflects no obligation, and thus no individual protection, at all.161 
A more careful analysis suggests, however, that this assessment is too hasty 
and the analysis too superficial. The language “with a view to determining” is 
indeed ambiguous. It could have only a weak sense of “aiming toward,” but 
could also have a strong sense of “in order to.” Unfortunately, as noted above 
the available background records from the OECD and the U.S. ratification 
process offer no guidance on this score.162 A number of considerations 
nonetheless suggest that a properly situated defendant could make a strong 
                                                                                                                       
 158 United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Such treaty-based 
protections are by no means unusual. A prominent example is extradition treaties, which 
commonly preclude extradition to a foreign country when the basis for the request is a crime 
for which the person has already been convicted or acquitted. See MICHAEL ABBELL, 
EXTRADITION TO AND FROM THE UNITED STATES 109 (2010) (“With two exceptions, all 
United States extradition treaties negotiated since World War II contain provisions 
prohibiting the extradition of persons convicted, acquitted, or being tried in the requested 
country for the same acts or offenses for which their extradition is requested.”); see also 
U.N. Model Treaty on Extradition, G.A. Res. 45/116, art. 3(d), U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/116 
(Dec. 14, 1990) (providing the same protection). 
 159 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 4, para. 3. 
 160 United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706, 711 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 161 Id. at 711–12 (so stating, and concluding that “the provision requires nothing more 
than consultation upon request; it does not require any additional actions of the party 
countries”). 
 162 See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying text. 
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argument that Article 4, paragraph 3 creates a protection against double 
jeopardy—although of course only for a single offense as defined in the OECD 
Convention and only after a formal request by another member state with 
jurisdiction. 
First, the language of the provision is obligatory (“shall”), a consideration 
the Supreme Court highlighted in its most recent decision on the self-execution 
doctrine.163 Second, the equally official French language text of the treaty 
indicates that the legal consequence of a request for consultation is a required 
end of determining “the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.” In 
specific, the French language version of Article 4, paragraph 3 (“afin de 
decider”) reflects a sense of “in order to decide.” This connects the obligation 
of consultation with a specific, required outcome—a determination of “the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution.” 
In addition, some indications from the “postratification understanding” of 
the parties to the Convention support a protective meaning in Article 4, 
paragraph 3.164 In 2007, for example, the OECD held an “Expert Meeting” on 
the Convention, one purpose of which was to address “Enhanced International 
Co-ordination and Co-operation.”165 At this conference, the Chair of the 
OECD’s Working Group on Bribery presented a paper that expressly 
recognized that Article 4, paragraph 3 creates a protection against double 
jeopardy: “Once a definitive court ruling has been handed down in one of the 
States, at latest, proceedings underway in the other States should cease. 
Otherwise, this could result in violation of the principle of double jeopardy or 
ne bis in idem.”166 Moreover, at least one OECD member state, South Korea, 
has taken the explicit stance that Article 4, paragraph 3 creates such a 
protection.167 
  
                                                                                                                       
 163 See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 508 (2008) (reasoning that the treaty at issue 
there was not self-executing because it did not “provide that the United States ‘shall’ or 
‘must’” take a specific action). 
 164 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 165 See Agenda: Experts’ Meeting: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: The Road 
Ahead, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 21, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/ 
dataoecd/8/35/39769918.pdf. 
 166 Mark Pieth & Juliette Leliuer, Strengthening International Coordination and 
Cooperation, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (Nov. 21, 2007), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/39691044. 
pdf. 
 167 See Brief for Appellant at 38, United States v. Jeong, 624 F.3d 706 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(No. 09-11127) (observing that the Republic of Korea had declared in a submission to the 
court, “[i]t is our view that the [OECD Anti-Bribery] Convention prohibits prosecution in 
more than one jurisdiction for the same offenses (prohibition of double jeopardy)”). 
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One can also contrast the more muscular language of Article 4, paragraph 3 
with similar provisions in other anti-corruption treaties. The parallel provision 
in the widely accepted United Nations Convention Against Corruption (with 
161 member states),168 for example, only requires that the parties, “as 
appropriate, consult one another with a view to coordinating their actions.”169 
The UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime contains the same 
weak language.170 At the risk of emphasizing the obvious, neither similar treaty 
states as a requirement a determination of “the most appropriate jurisdiction for 
prosecution.”171 
The United States also ratified the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention with no 
provision purporting to limit its force as directly applicable (i.e., self-executing) 
domestic law.172 President Clinton’s Letter of Transmittal to the Senate has no 
language to that effect.173 But a more significant matter is the absence of any 
corresponding reservation, understanding, or declaration (so-called RUDs) by 
the Senate as part of its resolution of consent to ratification of the OECD 
Convention.174 By the late 1990s, the Senate had a well-established practice of 
declaring, in the case of any doubt, that a treaty it was approving was non-self-
executing or at least did not create private rights.175 No such thing happened 
with the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Indeed, the State Department 
expressly confirmed in testimony to the Senate at the time that at least some 
provisions in the Convention are self-executing.176 
                                                                                                                       
 168 UNCAC Signature and Ratification Status, UN OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME (July 
12, 2012), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html. 
 169 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, art. 42, para. 5, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/58/4, at 22 (Nov. 21, 2003). 
 170 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, annex I, art. 15, 
para. 5, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25, at 13 (Jan. 8, 2001). 
 171 In contrast, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime has a provision 
identical to Article 4, paragraph 3 in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. See Convention 
on Cybercrime art. 22(5), Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185 (requiring consultation “with a 
view to determining the most appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution”). 
 172 Substantial, well-founded doubt exists over whether a treaty may establish a crime on 
its own (i.e., whether such a treaty could be “self-executing”). Whatever the correct answer 
to that question, self-executing treaties have throughout history created rights in favor of 
individuals, and that is the argument with respect to Article 4, paragraph 3. 
 173 See President’s Letter of Transmittal, supra note 35. 
 174 See Exec. Session, Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions, 144 CONG. REC. S9668-01 (daily ed. July 31, 1998). 
 175 See Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional 
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 419 (2000) (observing that by the 1990s the Senate had a 
well-established practice, at least with regard to human rights treaties of including 
“declarations stating that the substantive provisions of the treaties are not self-executing,” 
which declarations were “designed to preclude the treaties from being enforceable in U.S. 
courts in the absence of implementing legislation”). 
 176 See COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF 
FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS, S. EXEC. REP. NO. 
105-19, at 78 (1998). 
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The view that the OECD Convention provides some level of double 
jeopardy protection also finds support in the traditional principle of “liberal” 
treaty construction. An outgrowth of the obligation of good faith 
performance,177 this canon of treaty interpretation holds that, in cases of doubt, 
domestic courts should interpret a treaty in a way protective of private rights. 
Thus, as the Supreme Court declared in the 1879 case of Hauenstein v. Lynham, 
“[w]here a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to the rights, 
that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal, the latter is to be 
preferred.”178 A half century later, the Court explained the broader foundations 
for this doctrine in Factor v. Laubenheimer: “Considerations which should 
govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, 
as well,” the court reasoned, “require that obligations should be liberally 
construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality 
and reciprocity between them.”179 As I have explained elsewhere,180 the modern 
Supreme Court has not applied this notion with vigor, but neither has it 
expressly rejected it. This interpretive presumption would thus support a 
reading of Article 4, paragraph 3 of the OECD Convention in favor of double 
jeopardy protections—provided, of course, that another member state with 
jurisdiction requests in advance a formal determination of “the most appropriate 
jurisdiction for prosecution.” 
On the other hand, a recent restrictive attitude of some federal courts on the 
force of treaties may support a more jaundiced view. Some federal courts have 
recognized, without supporting authority, a presumption that treaties do not 
create private rights.181 Separately, the Supreme Court has long observed that 
the executive branch’s interpretation of a treaty “is entitled to great weight,”182 
and it is a near certainty that the executive branch will assert that the language 
of Article 4, paragraph 3 places no limits on its prosecutorial powers. Finally, a 
skeptic will acknowledge the language of obligation in Article 4, paragraph 3 
(“shall”) but nonetheless focus on the operative verb only (“consult”). If one 
does not connect this verb with a required outcome (as the equally authentic 
French language version does), the language of Article 4, paragraph 3 merely 
creates an obligation of discussion. All that would then remain is some version 
                                                                                                                       
 177 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (citing, inter alia, the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 107, at art. 26). 
 178 100 U.S. 483, 487 (1879). 
 179 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933). 
 180 See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a 
Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1911–14 (2005). 
 181 See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 389 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(declaring that “[a]s a general rule . . . international treaties do not create rights that are 
privately enforceable in the federal courts”); United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 
195–96 (5th Cir. 2001) (same); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008) 
(citing this authority). 
 182 See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 513 (quoting Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982)); El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 
525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999). 
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of international “comity.”183 But this notion is discretionary only and would 
allow, but not require, U.S. authorities to decline to prosecute a defendant 
already convicted of the same crime by another OECD member state.184 
Nonetheless, as I have suggested above, a talented advocate could construct 
a compelling argument that Article 4, paragraph 3 of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention alone creates a protection against double jeopardy among the 
member states. Where, therefore, another member state makes a corresponding 
formal request, a strong argument may exist that the involved member states 
must identify “the most appropriate jurisdiction” among them for prosecution of 
the specific offense defined in the Convention, and that double jeopardy should 
attach to any bona fide prosecution by the chosen jurisdiction. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bribery is a scourge, the more so when it involves the corruption of a 
“foreign public official”185 in “the performance of official duties.”186 
Nonetheless, the pursuit of even highly worthy goals such as combating 
corruption must unfold within the bounds of fundamental principles of justice. 
And few principles are as fundamental as a protection against being “twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb.”187 It was for this reason that a report of world 
business leaders recently recommended, in connection with the 2011 G20 
Summit in Cannes, France, that “[t]he principle contained in Article 4.3 of the 
OECD [anti-bribery] convention … should be ‘translated’ into a more 
immediate and effective rule of international ne bis in idem to be introduced in 
                                                                                                                       
 183 As the Supreme Court observed in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895), 
“‘Comity’ . . . is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere 
courtesy and good will, upon the other.” International comity begins with the principle that 
statutes—and even more treaties—“should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or 
conduct if that regulation would conflict with principles of international law.” Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part). Indeed, as 
Justice Scalia observed in Hartford Fire, this principle has specific reference to the 
extraterritorial application of criminal statutes. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 818 
(specifically relying on the principle in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
§ 403(1) that a state should not exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction where this would be 
“unreasonable”). For a more general review of international comity, see Joel R. Paul, Comity 
in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1991). 
 184 The U.S. Department of Justice in fact has a policy relating to federal prosecution 
following a conviction under state criminal law. Named after Petite v. United States, 361 
U.S. 529 (1960), this “Petite Policy” “establishes guidelines for the exercise of discretion by 
appropriate officers of the Department of Justice in determining whether to bring a federal 
prosecution based on substantially the same act(s) or transactions involved in a prior state or 
federal proceeding.” See U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Attorney’s Manual § 9-2.031(A) (2011). 
 185 See OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 1, at art. 1, para. 4(a). 
 186 See id. at art. 1, para. 1. 
 187 U.S. Const. amend. V. 
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the various anti-bribery national acts and legislation.”188 A recent 
comprehensive report by the International Bar Association advanced a similar 
recommendation.189 
As a matter of domestic constitutional law, the established “dual 
sovereignty” doctrine bars any general claim of international double jeopardy 
protection. I have suggested here, however, that the courts may need to refine 
their thinking about this doctrine in light of the modern phenomenon of treaty-
based crimes. In such cases, the law that defines the criminal act derives, 
contrary to a principal justification for the dual sovereignty doctrine, from a 
single source: international law. That is, the ultimate source of the law is a 
binding legal obligation under which member states have consensually limited 
their sovereign powers as a matter of international law. And if this view has 
merit, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention would seem to be a prime example, 
for it defines a specific offense and obligates member states to incorporate into 
domestic law that specific offense without derogation. 
As a separate matter, the specific terms of Article 4, paragraph 3 of the 
OECD Convention also may create double jeopardy protections. This is not the 
case without a corresponding formal request by another member state. But I 
have suggested here that a compelling double jeopardy argument may exist 
where one state has formally requested the identification of “the most 
appropriate jurisdiction for prosecution” of a specific offense defined in the 
Convention. Even this argument, however, may well founder against the recent 
restrictive attitude of some U.S. courts on the interpretation of treaties. 
Even if a valid claim of treaty-based double jeopardy claim were to exist, its 
scope would be limited. First, it would extend only to a successive prosecution 
of the specific substantive offense defined by the OECD Convention. Moreover, 
the Convention covers only so-called “supply-side” bribery and thus would not 
provide double jeopardy protection with respect to past convictions by the 
“host” country—or indeed by any other non-member state to the Convention. 
Finally, double jeopardy protection would not extend to other or multiple 
criminal acts, whether based on domestic statutes or the Convention itself. 
  
                                                                                                                       
 188 CANNES B20 BUS. SUMMIT, FINAL REPORT WITH APPENDICES at A-88 (2011), 
available at http://www.b20.fr/uploads/presse/Final-Report-with-with-appendices-B20-
2011.pdf. 
 189 See INTN’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON EXTRATERRITORIAL 
JURISDICTION 262 (recommending “that a protocol be developed under the auspices of the 
OECD” that “include[s] a double jeopardy component . . . triggered by final action in the 
most appropriate jurisdiction”). 
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Nonetheless, the distilled message here is that the modern phenomenon of 
treaty-based criminal law may require courts and scholars to refine their 
understanding of international double jeopardy. The argument is neither clean 
nor clear. But much room for skillful, zealous advocacy exists for lawyers who 
represent defendants in successive OECD Anti-Bribery Convention 
prosecutions. 
 
